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STUDENT ARTICLE
WHEN THE MAJORITY SAYS YOU MAY DIE:
AID-IN-DYING INITIATIVES
ARTHUR A. POVELONES, JR.*
A democratic system of government must be judged at least
in part by whether the laws made under the system adequately
reflect the enduring will of the majority of the people the govern-
ment represents. An optimal governmental structure, then, must
encourage policies furthering this enduring will while discourag-
ing others. The founders of the United States, for instance, real-
ized that neither simple rule by the majority nor concentration
of political power in either the legislative or the executive branch
would fulfill the long-term needs of most people.' They
attempted to avoid both of these outcomes by creating a republi-
can system of representative government, whereby the people
would have the authority to make laws, but only through having a
say in the selection of legislators and the president.2 The U.S.
* BA., 1992, Claremont McKenna College; Thomas J. White Scholar,
1993-1995; J.D. Candidate, 1995, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Most analysts, particularly opponents of direct democracy, correctly
refer to documents such as the Federalist Papers as evidence of the hostility of
the founders to pure direct democracy. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51 (James
Madison). This, however, tells only half the story:
An animating principle of the American Revolution and the
Declaration of Independence was that a just government must derive
its powers from the consent of the people.... The Declaration added
enormously to the quest for democratic procedures, heightening
yearnings of ordinary people for suffrage as well as for more self-rule.
THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMocRAcY. THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFEREN-
DUM, AND RECALL 12 (1989). This dual emphasis suggests that fidelity to the
framers does not demand complete rejection of direct democracy, and cuts
against conclusory assertions that the thinking of the founders does not trans-
late to contemporary political debate. The issue, then and now, centers on
what degree of direct democracy governments "deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed," THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2
(U.S. 1776), can implement while continuing to work justly and efficiently.
2. The Constitution calls for direct election of Representatives by the
people. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. It reserved selection of Senators to the
state legislatures, id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 1, until enactment of the Seventeenth
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Constitution further tested the strength of popular desire for
new laws by establishing several institutional checks that pro-
posed bills would have to survive, including a bicameral legisla-
ture,3 an executive veto,4 and judicial review.5
The Constitution guaranteed a "republican" form of govern-
ment to all states as well.6 Progressive-era reformers, though,,
weary of their inability to push the proposals they advocated
through an unyielding (and, in their view, corrupt) legislative
process, 7 successfully convinced many states to adopt procedures
for lawmaking by initiative.8 This alternative permits citizens to
place proposed legislation directly before the people for a popu-.
lar vote, with the proposal becoming law if a majority of the vot-
ers approve the measure.
In states with initiative lawmaking, then, issues may receive
resolution either through the legislative process or through the
initiative process. This Article analyzes both methods in the con-
text of physician aid-in-dying9 and finds both processes as cur-
Amendment in 1913, which provides for popular election of Senators. Id. at
amend. XVII. The Constitution provides that the states choose presidential
electors, who then elect a president, with the House of Representatives
choosing from the top three candidates if the majority of electors do not vote
for one candidate. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
Apparently, the states must permit the people to select the electors; see The
Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). This, then, gives the people an
indirect voice in the selection of the president.
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1. The Constitution also reduced the prospect of
pure popular accountability in the Senate by providing for six-year terms and
an equal number of senators for each state. Id. at art I, § 3.
4. Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
5. See id. at art. III, § 2 (jurisdiction in "all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803) (declaring constitutional necessity of judicial review).
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
7. See DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAwmAKERS 5-14 (1989), for a sympathetic
discussion of the labors of Progressive reformers for direct democracy.
8. Currently, 22 states (along with the District of Columbia) have
established an initiative process: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 296-97. Some of these states, though,
provide only for "indirect" initiatives or limit the subject matter of initiatives.
9. I use the phrase "aid-in-dying" in order to encompass both "assisted
suicide," where a physician provides a person with a lethal dose of medication
for purposes of suicide and possibly instructs the person on such use but does
not actually introduce the medication, and "euthanasia," where the physician
performs the life-ending action at the person's request. For discussions of the
distinctions between assisted suicide and euthanasia and arguments to legalize
the former but not the latter, see.Maria T. .CeloCruz, Aid-in-Dying: Should We
Decriminalize Physician-Assisted Suicide and Physician-Committed Euthanasia , 18 Am.
AID-IN-DYING INITIATIVES
rently structured systematically unable to resolve aid-in-dying
questions in accordance with the enduring will of the people.
The Article then maps out a potential synthesis of the legislative
and initiative processes in an attempt to capture the unique
advantages of each form of lawmaking. Part I of the Article
briefly sets out the parameters for discussion. Part II moves on to
the shortcomings of leaving aid-in-dying questions to the legisla-
ture and points out the need for some increased participation by
the people as a whole. Part III of the Article in turn evaluates the
initiative process, with an eye toward the initiative approved by
Oregon's voters in November 1994, l° as well as the rejected pro-
posals in Washington" and California,12 and concludes that laws
drafted through this process have less likelihood of representing
the long-term wishes of the people than laws drafted by the legis-
lature do."3 Part IV presents a potential alternative process with
the goal of allowing the public to have a greater opportunity to
focus the legislature on issues like aid-in-dying while not becom-
ing prisoner to the sentiments of initiative drafters or potentially
transitory public opinion. Part V will briefly conclude by consid-
ering the implications of reform for aid-in-dying proposals.
J. L. & MED. 369, 386-87 (1992); Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill -
Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1380
(1992). The institutional analysis set out in this Article, however, essentially
remains the same regardless of the scope of the initiative, so, for the sake of
simplicity, this Article will combine the categories except if specifically
distinguished.
10. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act (1994), Oregon Ballot Measure
No. 16, reprinted in Kane v. Kulongoski, 871 P.2d 993, 1001-06 (Or. 1994)
(hereinafter "Oregon Initiative"). See also Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D.
Or. 1994) (preliminary injunction barring enforcement).
11. Initiative for Death With Dignity, Washington Initiative No. 119
(1991).
12. The California Death With Dignity Act, California Proposition No.
161 (1992) (hereinafter "California Initiative").
13. In addition to the initiatives listed above, Jack Kevorkian and his
supporters proposed an initiative that would have added the following
provision to the Michigan constitution: "The right of competent adults, who are
incapacitated by incurable medical conditions, to voluntarily request and
receive medical assistance with respect to whether or not their lives continue,
shall not be restrained or abridged." Kevorkian Begins Ballot Drive for Suicide
Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at A13. They failed to obtain enough
signatures to place the proposal on the ballot. Anne Mullens, A Landmark Vote
on Assisted Suicide, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20, 1994, at A25.
The Michigan proposal's brevity would have necessitated that the judiciary
take a prominent role in interpreting the right granted; for this reason, this
proposal would have proven as undesirable as unilateral attempts by the
judiciary to resolve the issue. See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
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I. PARAMETERS
Questions regarding both the general efficacy of direct
democracy1 4 and the constitutional aspects of aid-in-dying15 must
remain outside the scope of this Article in order to limit discus-
sion to the practical issues revolving around aid-in-dying
initiatives.
This Article will consider only aid-in-dying initiatives, as
opposed to referenda sent to the people by the legislature for
approval.16 It will limit the analysis in this way for three reasons.
First, referenda require that the legislature have passed an aid-in-
dying statute. Legislators, though, as later discussion will show,
have proven quite reluctant to deal with the issue 7 - hence the
need for direct lawmaking in the first place. Second, initiatives
raise more practical concerns in terms of drafting than referenda
because the legislature has little if any role in drafting initia-
tives." Third, the aid-in-dying initiatives proposed in recent
years provide a concrete reference point for discussion of aid-in-
dying through popular lawmaking.
This Article will also assume that the initiative process in
general represents a constitutional method of decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule squarely on this question,
14. Many analysts have compiled lists of the advantages and disadvantages
of popular lawmaking. See DAVID BUTLER & AUSTIN RANNEY, REFERENDUMS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 24-37 (1978); CRONIN, supra note
1, at 208-12; FARLAN HAHN & SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, REFERENDUM VOTING:
SOCIAL STATUS AND POLICY PREFERENCES 16-23 (1987); DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION 27-30 (1984); SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 26-40; JOSEPH F.
ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: POPULISM REVIVED 90-95 (1986);
Gregory Schmid, Reviving Athenian Democracy in California, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 499, 522-25 (1994).
15. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. See alsoYale Kamisar, Are
Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June
1993, at 32; David M. Smolin, The Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, and the Right to Active and Passive Euthanasia, 10 ISSUES IN L. &
MED. 3 (1994); Tom Stacy, Euthanasia and the Supreme Court's Competing
Conceptions of Religious Liberty, 10 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 55 (1994).
16. In the initiative process voters directly place a proposed statute or
constitutional amendment on the ballot by obtaining signatures of a specific
number of registered voters. In a referendum, the voters may petition to vote
on a statute or constitutional amendment that the legislature has approved, or
the legislature may vote to refer a measure for a popular vote. MAGLEBY, supra
note 14, at 1. Currently, 23 states have a referendum procedure. Only Illinois
has an initiative procedure but not a referendum procedure (and the initiative
procedure has proven so impenetrable that only one initiative has even
qualified for the ballot). Maryland and New Mexico have a referendum
procedure but no initiative procedure. See SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 296-97.
17. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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although it has upheld numerous initiatives over the years 19 and
has spoken approvingly of the process.2 ° In the leading case,
involving a challenge to the constitutionality of initiative lawmak-
ing on the grounds that laws bypassing the legislative process
denied the "republican" system of government that the Constitu-
tion guaranteed to the states, the Supreme Court ruled the
republican nature of a state government a political question.2 1
This rationale proves unconvincing,22 and the Court has left the
issue open, but the constitutionality of the initiative process in all
likelihood will survive any challenge, both theoretically2 and
19. See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Eastlake v.
Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
20. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) ("California's
entire history demonstrates the repeated use of referendums to give citizens a
voice on questions of public policy. . . . Provisions for referendums
demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or
prejudice.").
21. Pacific St. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). The Court,
quoting Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849), found:
Under this article of the constitution it rests with congress to
decide what government is the established one in a State. For, as the
United States guarantee to each State a republican government,
congress must necessarily decide what government is established in
the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And
when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the
councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which
they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by
the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on
every other department of the government, and could not be
questioned in a judicial tribunal.
223 U.S. at 147.
22. The acceptance of representatives, a formality, hardly constitutes a
formal evaluation by the national government of the governmental structure of
the state. At most, accepting the representative only affirms the legitimacy of
the representative, not the republican nature of other aspects of the
government or even of the government as a whole. See generally LouisJ. Sirico,
Jr., The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REv. 637, 651
(1980).
23. The term "republican" contemplates many different ways of
organizing governments; any legitimate government mixes direct will and
delegated authority in some respect, so the vagueness of the term, the interest
of the founders in both democratic and republican principles (see supra note 1),
and federalism concerns dictate deference of review. Also, in evaluating
constitutionality, courts cannotjudge the republican nature of a government by
examining the initiative process in isolation, just as they cannot do so by
examining the actions of an unelected administrative agency in isolation.
Instead, they must weigh the republican nature of the entire state government.
The existence and occasional use of the initiative process, then, should not
make the entire state government unrepublican. See generally Sirico, supra note
22, at 651-61.
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practically.24
In addition, this Article will analyze only efforts to legalize
physician aid-in-dying in some manner. Because virtually all
states have prohibited aid-in-dying either specifically or generally,
persons supporting aid-in-dying have more incentive to use the
initiative process than those opposing aid-in-dying laws do. Of
course, opponents of aid-in-dying laws remain free to propose a
"preemptive" initiative to better secure prevailing attitudes on
aid-in-dying from either the legislature or subsequent statutory
initiative. Initiatives along these lines have recently occurred
concerning issues of similar moral divisiveness, such as abor-
tion25 and homosexual rights.26
The Article will further assume that at least some aid-in-
dying legislation can withstand constitutional scrutiny. The best
indication of the potential avenues of constitutional attack has
come with the lawsuit brought by aid-in-dying opponents to over-
turn the Oregon initiative. They have alleged that the Oregon
initiative: 1) violates the equal protection rights of terminally ill
persons; 2) deprives terminally ill persons who do not wish assist-
ance in suicide of life and liberty without due process of law; 3) is
unconstitutionally vague; and 4) violates the free exercise and
association rights of physicians and health care providers
opposed to aid-in-dying.27 Opponents could have raised .the
same objection had Oregon acted through the legislature rather
than through popular initiative. This Article will focus on how
the nature of the initiative process increases the likelihood that
popularly enacted aid-in-dying statutes will prove susceptible to
constitutional challenges.
24. One can imagine the uproar if the Supreme Court invalidated the
initiative process after permitting it to exist for over 80 years. See Sirico, supra
note 22, at 646.
25. In the same year that Washington rejected an aid-in-dying initiative,
the voters approved (by an extremely narrow margin) an initiative replacing the
state's abortion law with a less restrictive measure. Abortion Rights Measure Wins,
Barely, in Washington State, N.Y. TimS, Nov. 22, 1991, at A16.
26. Colorado passed an initiative that said that the state or any of its
localities could not "enact, adopt, or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance
or policy whereby homosexual . . . orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute . . . any minority status, quota preference,
protected status or claim of discrimination." COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b. At this
writing, courts have enjoined enforcement of the initiative. Evans v. Romer,
882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
27. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1496-501 (D. Or. 1994), appeal
docketed, No. 95-35031 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1995) (preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of the initiative). In addition to the constitutional objections, the
suit alleges that that the initiative violates the Americans With Disabilities Act.
869 F. Supp. at 1499.
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Similarly, this Article will assume that courts will not strike
down legislation criminalizing aid-in-dying. As of late, judicial
decisions have borne out this assumption. The Michigan
Supreme Court ruled that Michigan's recently enacted statute
criminalizing assisted suicide did not violate the Constitution. 28
A district court judge in New York upheld New York's assisted
suicide law29 in a case brought by Dr. Timothy Quill, whose arti-
cle in the New England Journal of Medicine detailing his role in the
death of one of his patients ° sparked criminal charges. Most
recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained
Washington's assisted suicide law.31 A judicially-fashioned right
to aid-in-dying, as these courts have recognized, would raise more
cause for concern than an aid-in-ding regime created by the leg-
islature or through an initiative..2 Judges would, as their job
requires, make decisions primarily from choices advocated by liti-
gants; the other institutions can consider the needs of all inter-
ested parties.3" Judges also lack the access to expertise on the
issue upon which the legislature (and, to a lesser extent, propo-
nents of an initiative) can rely.34 Finally, the legitimacy of the
resolution of these questions may require deference to the views
of a broader constituency. Ironically, the value Americans place
28. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3692 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1995) (No. 94-1490). In the case, the court also
ruled that the legislation did not violate Michigan's single-subject rule and it
limited murder prosecutions to cases where "death was the direct and natural
result of a defendant's act." 527 N.W.2d at 716.
29. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Quill resorted to
this suit when a New York task force unanimously recommended that New York
not change its assisted suicide laws. NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND
THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE
MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994) (hereinafter Task Force); Timothy E. Quill, The Care of
Last Resort, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1994, § 1, at 19.
30. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity - A Case of Individualized Decision
Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
31. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL 94679
(9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995), rev'g 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
32. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84 ("the resolution of this issue is left to the
normal democratic processes within the State"); Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 733
("the question clearly is a policy one that is appropriately left to the citizenry for
resolution, either through its elected representatives or through a ballot
initiative").
33. See Robert A. Burt, Death Made Too Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at
A19 ("Legislation can be confined to incremental steps.... But in its nature,
all judicially imposed constitutional change can be based only on generalized
abstractions and, like Roe, must apply to the whole nation and protect the
furthest reach of everyone's claim to self-determination").
34. Cf. infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing resources
available to the legislature in drafting bills).
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on self-government by communities for the common good may
preclude the courts from intervening to protect the self-determi-
nation of individuals.3 5
II. DISADVANTAGES OF RELYING ON LEGISLATURES
Advocates of direct democracy have long criticized the legis-
lative process, citing many perceived shortcomings. They have
claimed most fundamentally that initiatives represent the collec-
tive will of the people,36 while "special interests" capture the leg-
islature and cause it often to reject bills furthering the interest of
the majority of the people.37 These broad general claims have
serious flaws, but more specific allegations of procedural failures
prove more noteworthy, particularly when evaluated in the con-
text of issues such as aid-in-dying.
For instance, exclusive reliance on legislatures for the pas-
35. See, e.g., Terry Eastland, Shameless in Seattle, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1994,
at 57. Responding to the analogy of aid-in-dying to abortion, Eastland wrote:
It is axiomatic that once judges declare a constitutional right, the
people are no longer free to decide the issue democratically. When
that declared right cannot be found in the text or history of the
Constitution, as occurred in Roe, the decision is likely to be less
respected, and loss of the right to self-government even more sharply
felt, especially when the issue involves deeply held moral beliefs.
Id.
36. See BTrruR & RANNE', supra note 14, at 24; HAHN & KAmIENIECKI, supra
note 14, at 6; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 3.
37. Progressives such as Senator Robert M. LaFollette consistently
condemned the role of interest groups in lawmaking and viewed initiatives as a
way to circumvent these interest groups. ZIMERMAN, supra note 14, at 90.
Of course, interest groups affect initiatives as well. Proponents of the aid-
in-dying initiatives have roundly criticized the role of the Catholic Church in
opposing the initiatives. See, e.g., Paul Jacobs, Proposition 161; Suicide Measure
Losing Cash Battle, LA. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at A3 (Catholics impose their view
of euthanasia on others); Paul Jacobs, Proposition 161; Outcome of Death Measure
May Rest on 11th Hour Ads, LA. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at A3 (hereinafter 11th
Hour Ads) ("group of powerful religious zealots"). In both California and
Oregon, Catholic churches took separate collections during masses to raise
funds for the anti-initiative campaigns. Sandi Dolbee, Catholics Dig Deep to Fight
Euthanasia Ballot Measure, SAN DIEGo UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 15, 1992, at Al; Mark
O'Keefe, Catholics Keep Up Lonely Vigil on Suicide, OREGONIAN, Sept. 25, 1994, at
BI (hereinafter Lonely Vigil). In both states, this fundraising enabled
opponents of the initiatives to outspend proponents in the latter stages of the
campaigns. Jacobs, 11th Hour Ads, supra; Mark O'Keefe, Assisted Suicide Measure
Survives Heavy Opposition, OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al (hereinafter Measure
Survives).
Interest groups, then, will influence lawmaking whether through
legislatures or initiatives. In any event, as one analyst persuasively comments,
"[O]ne person's 'special interest group' is another's 'public interest group'."
SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 37.
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sage of laws gives the legislature extensive freedom to set the
agenda of issues it will deliberate on."8 While elections may
encourage representatives to take positive actions on the issue or
issues that motivate their constituents when they choose candi-
dates, elections will do little to compel legislators to act affirma-
tively on issues on which voters will not base their candidate
choices.3 9 On the other hand, if a legislator makes a serious
attempt at reform on an issue, the attempt will alienate the voters
favoring no reform and drive some of those voters into open
opposition to that legislator.4 °
Aid-in-dying represents a perfect example of the type of
issue that constantly will defy resolution through the legislature
alone. Voters will virtually never make aid-in-dying questions so
prominent in their decision to vote for a candidate that they will
demand that legislators take a firm stand on the issue in a cam-
paign and enact legislation on the subject after elections. 41 Aid-
in-dying questions do, however, elicit strong emotions on the
part of adherents on both sides of the issue.4 2 If legislators take a
strong position on the issue, they risk incurring the wrath of
opponents to their view, some of whom would likely direct more
energy to defeating the legislators in their bids for reelection. At
the same time, the legislators will not gain a reciprocal benefit of
loyal support from people agreeing with their view on the sub-
ject; these people, while approving the reform effort, will still
38. For a general discussion of this problem, see BUTLER & RANNEY, supra
note 14, at 29-30; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 90.
39. Extending the focus of legislative candidates has its drawbacks as well.
The issues that voters consider when choosing candidates more likely than not
truly involve the most important public policy questions. If so, substantial
discussion of voter initiatives may unwisely divert candidates' attention from the
primary issues of the legislative campaign. See David B. Magleby, Taking the
Initiative: Direct Legislation and Direct Democracy in the 1980's, 21 P.S. 600, 608
(1988). The aid-in-dying campaigns support this proposition only partially.
Compare Robert Reinhold, California to Decide if Doctors Can Aid in Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at Al (none of the four U.S. Senate candidates in
California in 1992 took a position on the California initiative) with Steve Wilson,
Oregon Election to Test Future of "Right-to-Die" Movement, Az. REP., Oct. 19, 1994, at
A2 (both gubernatorial candidates in Oregon in 1994 opposed the Oregon
initiative).
40. See generally HAHN & KAMIENIECKI, supra note 14, at 17.
41. JAMES M. HOEFLER, DEATHRIGHT: CULTURE, MEDICINE, POLITICS, AND
THE RIGHT TO DIE 213-14 (1994). Hoefler concluded that legislators, seeing no
benefit in acting themselves, decided to leave the issue to the courts.
42. The amount of money spent on the aid-in-dying initiative campaigns
provides the best indication of this. For instance, organizers of the Washington
initiatives spent approximately $1.7 million attempting to secure passage of the
initiative, while opponents spent approximately $2 million. DONALD W. Cox,
HEMLOCK'S CUP: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEATH WrrH DIGNITY 154 (1993).
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base their votes on the primary issues. As self-interested actors,
then, legislators have a strong incentive simply to refuse to bring
up aid-in-dying questions at all, because the negative electoral
repercussions with regard to the issue strongly outweigh the
benefits.
This legislative reluctance to tackle aid-in-dying issues
receives strong empirical support. While a substantial majority of
the public favors some form of aid-in-dying (at least in theory),"
very few state legislatures have considered legislation attempting
to legalize aid-in-dying in some way." In fact, legislatures argua-
bly would not have considered the issue absent the initiative
efforts,45 and once the issue reaches the legislature it almost inva-
riably dies with alacrity without ever reaching the floor.'
Clearly, legislatures have exhibited a marked reluctance to con-
sider aid-in-dying measures, at least partially for the reasons
detailed above.47 At least if the legislature openly debated and
43. Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying?
The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658 (1992) (at least 60% support for
euthanasia between 1977 and 1991); Poll: Americans Back Euthanasia,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 30, 1995, at A14 (67% support nationally for provisions
of Oregon initiative).
44. 31 states have specifically criminalized assisted suicide, which covers
any act of aid-in-dying. Physicians engaging in active euthanasia fall within
homicide statutes in all states. David R. Schanker, Note, Of Suicide Machines,
Euthanasia Legislation, and the Health Care Crisis, 68 IND. L.J. 977, 983 & n.31
(1993).
45. Bills introduced in Iowa and Maine in 1992 followed the California
initiative closely; see id. at 1002. At this writing, legislators have proposed bills
modeled on the Oregon initiative in at least five states. Assisted-Suicide Bill is
Offered in State Senate, SEAtrLE TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at B3 (Washington); Ergo!
Booming Right to Die Legislation Across USA, PR NEwswIRE, Feb. 8, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (California, New Hampshire); Susan
Hogan-Albach, Assisted Suicide Debate Grows, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Jan. 10,
1995, at 1B (Wisconsin); Connie Paige, Suicide Bill Proposed in State Legislatur4
BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 30, 1994, at 8 (Massachusetts).
46. Apparently, only the New Hampshire legislature has actually voted on
the issue; it rejected a bill that would have repealed the prohibition against
causing or aiding suicide. H.B. 296, 153d Leg., Reg. Sess., N.H. (1993).
California, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin
considered bills in 1994. Warren Wolfe, Several States Attempting to Legalize
Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 1994, at 17A.
47. Michigan's experience illustrates this ambivalence well. While
criminalizing assisted suicide, the legislature created a commission to consider
the issue and to recommend a course of action. After extensive wrangling and
concern over whether the commission's existence violated the constitution, the
panel could not reach even a general consensus on the issue. A Michigan Panel
Backs Suicide Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, § 1, at 31.
Legislators may also have balked at the prospect that if their state became
the first in the nation to legalize aid-in-dying, they risked attracting people to
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rejected an aid-in-dying proposal, the democratic process would
have functioned; perhaps the specific bill would fail to address all
concerns adequately, or maybe the legislature would simply con-
clude that any aid-in-dying statute proves unwise. When the legis-
lature suppresses the issue in order to protect its members,
however, the government fails to determine the wishes of the
people, and the process fails.
Introduction of some form of initiative process into the poli-
cymaking mix would help ensure that issues like aid-in-dying
receive the consideration the people desire.' While voters sup-
porting aid-in-dying might not evaluate legislators according to
their positions on the issue, they have a proven willingness to
sign petitions placing proposed aid-in-dying statutes on the bal-
lot.49 Leading supporters of aid-in-dying have shown the ability
to organize successful petition drives to place the issue before the
voters. 50 The resulting high-profile debate of the aid-in-dying ini-
tiatives has spurred public interest in the subject nationwide,5'
and it has helped spark action in legislatures, as mentioned ear-
lier. In short, the initiative process has enabled aid-in-dying to
take its place in the public spotlight, to the benefit of all. Demo-
cratic systems lacking some sort of initiative, though, more likely
would suppress consideration of aid-in-dying questions as thor-
oughly as possible, as self-regarding legislators would tend to
avoid alienating voters with a strong view on the subject.
the state specifically to obtain aid-in-dying (although a residency requirement
could partially guard against this possibility). If the Oregon initiative takes
effect, though, this concern would serve as less of a deterrent.
48. Edward Shertz, Euthanasia: Should the Public Decide?, 269 JAMA 590
(1993). For a general discussion of how initiatives place new issues before the
public, see SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 30 (discussing similar effects with regard to
toxic waste, nuclear weapons freezes, and "motor voter" bills).
49. This willingness to sign petitions need not, however, flow from
support for the initiative. Some people might sign petitions in the belief that
the people should vote on an issue, regardless of whether they support the
initiative or not. Indeed, some unscrupulous signature gatherers in the past
have covered up the text of the initiative attached to the petitions and urged
people to sign based on a slogan and an emphasis that signing the petition in
no way binds the voter. See MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 62.
50. Organizers obtained over 223,000 signatures for the Washington
initiative, well over the 150,000 needed. Cox, supra note 42, at 150. Organizers
of the California initiative gathered 600,000 signatures in six months, an
impressive feat. Id. at 172. Organizers of the Oregon initiative procured 95,000
signatures, well over the 66,771 required. Mullens, supra note 13, at A25. Aid-
in-dying advocates in Michigan collected over 200,000 signatures, although they
fell about 50,000 short of the amount they needed. Id.
51. The initiative organizers in Washington and California took solace in
the defeats because of the large audience they had reached. Cox, supra note
42, at 166, 178.
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III. DISADVANTAGES OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
While the complete absence of initiatives would take away an
important means of attracting attention to issues of public con-
cern, passage of aid-in-dying initiatives would have less likelihood
of fulfilling the enduring will of the people than the legislature
process would. Opponents of direct democracy present a carica-
ture of unrepentant single-issue activists who could not persuade
a legislature52 starting an initiative and using misleading advertis-
ing5" to woo voters who lack substantial knowledge of the issues
at stake54 in order to pass proposals inherently hostile to the
interests of the voting minority.55 Although these critics exagger-
ate their case, several practical difficulties raise legitimate con-
cerns about the initiative process.
A. General Drawbacks of Lawmaking by Initiative
The proposals sent before the people in initiative form in all
52. Kenneth Reich, The 64-Million Dollar Question, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 15.
53. Television ranks just behind newspapers as the source of information
most widely relied on by voters, and most people obtaining information from
television relied on advertisements as opposed to other coverage. See generally
MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 132.
Of course, advocates of initiatives have no monopoly on the use of
misleading advertising. In an extraordinary action, Washington's attorney
general filed a lawsuit against opponents of the Washington initiative under the
state's law banning false political advertising. The lawsuit focused on a flier
proclaiming that the initiative "would let doctors end patients' lives without
benefit of safeguards," with "no chance to change your mind." The attorney
general charged that the flier recklessly disregarded the actual content of the
initiative. See Margaret Miller, State Sues Enemies of Right-to-Die Initiative SEArTLE
TIMES, June 11, 1992, at DI; Margaret Miller, Attorney General Gets Heat for Suit -
120 Friends, 119 Foes Criticize Eikenberry, SEATTLE TIMES, June 12, 1992, at B4.
54. "'[] nformation costs' (the costs of learning about the various aspects
of the issue) are generally even higher [in initiative elections] than in candidate
elections." CRONIN, supra note 1, at 67. Voters have exhibited more
sophistication, however, than originally feared. Eugene Lee, California, in
BUTLER & RANNEY, supra note 14, at 119. Indeed, on issues like aid-in-dying
little need exists for any specialized knowledge of the issue, provided, that voters
receive enough general information to gain an impression of the guidelines any
initiative contains.
55. Critics who advance this argument overlook both the long history of
legislative suppression of minority interests and the empirical record of
initiatives, which compares to legislative lawmaking in that some laws have
protected minority interests while others have not. See CRONIN, supra note 1, at
92, 98. In any event, given the voluntary nature of the proposed aid-in-dying
regimes, a "tyranny of the majority" argument has little application to aid-in-
dying, beyond possibly a "slippery slope" argument with regard to perceptions
toward disabled persons.
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likelihood will lack the procedural detail of bills before the legis-
lature.56 State legislatures have people experienced in drafting
legislation who draw up proposed legislation, 7 especially for sig-
nificant bills such as aid-in-dying legislation. This "first draft"
then becomes subject to revisions at the hands of staff members
of sponsors, legal counsel, lobbyists, committee staff, committee
members, staff members of other legislators, and other legisla-
tors.5" In addition to spotting substantive difficulties, they will
have a much greater chance of finding procedural trouble spots
and amending the legislation to protect against these
problems.59
Advocates of initiatives typically must rely on their own
expertise in drafting the initiatives, because they have to devote
whatever resources they possess at the outset of the campaign to
circulating petitions. In addition, initiative drafters must write
with the electorate in mind, and this creates a vexing dilemma.
Initiatives lacking sufficient detail open the proponents up to
attack by opponents, and risk rejection by a wary public.6" If ini-
tiatives attempt to account for areas of concern, however, they
tend to become exceedingly complex. In this case, voters may
not want to attempt to wade through the details of the proposal,
and, as with overly vague initiatives, will reject it because they do
not understand its implications.61
The leading role single-issue activists must assume also
56. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 186.
57. See generally ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 92. Zimmerman, citing a
New York study, concluded that initiatives are drafted as well as legislation.
Unlike drafters of initiatives, however, drafters of bills in the legislature can
continue to work on poorly drafted bills after introduction; see infra notes 67-72
and accompanying text.
58. MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 187.
59. Some states make staff assistance available before drafting or have
state boards review the wording of initiatives and propose technical changes.
CRONIN, supra note 1, at 208; cf. Christopher A. Coury, Student Note, Direct
Democracy Through Initiative and Referendum: Checking the Balance, 8 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 573, 589 (1994). These bodies, though, do not have
the authority to suggest additional procedural details in aid-in-dying initiatives,
for those would represent "substantive" changes to the initiative.
60. SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 34.
61. MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 142. Voters can attempt to inform
themselves about the implications of an initiative in two ways. First, voters may
receive information about the initiative through the media prior to the
election. Generally, voters know nothing about an initiative until they actually
vote on it. Id. at 128-29. The aid-in-dying initiatives received extensive
coverage; still, just prior to the election on the California initiative, over one
third of likely voters could not even recognize the initiative, and almost one half
did not know enough about it to offer an opinion until pollsters explained the
initiative. The Times Poll, LA. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al; Voters Favor Term
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decreases the likelihood that the initiative will accurately reflect
the will of the people. Proponents of an initiative must mobilize
a large number of volunteers, due to petitioning and fundraising
constraints. 62 Interest groups provide the only realistic source
for these needs.63 Once a drafted initiative appears before the
public, only the petition process and the vote itself check the ini-
tiative's approval. Thus, interest groups need only concern
themselves with designing an initiative palatable enough to sur-
vive the petition process and to persuade a majority of the voters
to approve the initiative.' - These checks, particularly the vote,
will go a long way toward ensuring that the initiative reflects the
enduring will of the people.65 But the checks only guarantee
that the people will not vote for initiatives that stray farther from
current public will than the status quo. Initiatives perceived to
improve on the status quo will pass regardless of whether a more
evenhanded proposal could have better reflected the public will.
If the public does not debate the initiative vigorously, the incen-
tive to draft the initiative strategically becomes greater.'
Limits, Doctor-Aided Suicide, UPI, Oct. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
Second, voters may glean information from the description that appears
on the ballot. Most people lacking college-level reading ability, however, will
not comprehend this description. MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 118. The
description of the California initiative does not appear immune from this
problem. California Initiative, supra note 12.
62. See SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 194-200, which details many
recommendations for the organization of an initiative campaign, in recognition
of the crucial role of volunteers.
63. Rev. Ralph Mero, director of the Pacific Northwest Region of the
Hemlock Society, the preeminent organization pushing for legalization of aid-
in-dying, organized the effort in Washington. Cox, supra note 42, at 150. The
California proposal largely mirrored the model statute of the Hemlock Society.
Compare California Initiative, supra note 12, with DEREK HUMPHRY, DYING WrrH
DIGNrrY: UNDERSTANDING EUTHANASIA 199-201 (1992) (describing the Hemlock
Society model proposal). The Hemlock Society substantially guided the efforts
to secure passage of these initiatives. See generally Cox, supra note 42, at 158-79.
See also O'Keefe, Measure Survives, supra note 37, at Al (Hemlock Society the
largest contributor to the Oregon proponents).
64. See generally Sirico, supra note 22, at 669-70.
65. The petition process doomed the proposed constitutional
amendment in Michigan; see supra note 50. The Washington and California
initiatives failed their tests at the ballot box; voters rejected both by a 54-to-46
percent margin. Cox, supra note 42, at 166, 178. The Oregon initiative passed
by a 51-to-49 percent margin. Jane Meredith Adams, Oregonians Still Debating
Assisted-Suicide Law, CHI. TrIB., Dec. 8, 1994, at 33.
66. The aid-in-dying issue illustrates these phenomena well. Most voters
support aid-in-dying in general (see supra note 43), and this translated into
strong initial support for the aid-in-dying initiatives. See, e.g., Poll Finds Support
for Three Initiatives, UPI, Sept. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
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The limitations on amendment of initiatives that have
become law exacerbates the problem of deficient drafting. No
legislation can completely account for every eventuality, so
amendments serve as a valuable tool to improve a law to make it
more closely conform to the law's general intent. State constitu-
tions, however, typically limit the ability of the legislature to
amend initiatives, by such means as precluding changes to a pop-
ular initiative for a specified period of time6 7 or requiring a
supermajority vote.68 In addition, legislators will hesitate to sug-
gest changes to popularly enacted laws because of the inevitable
backlash for questioning the wisdom of the majority of the elec-
torate.69 The people could resort to initiatives to amend the ini-
tiative, but the process takes too much time and money for use as
a correction device for previous initiatives.7 0 On the other hand,
File (68% support for California initiative); Jeff Mapes, Support Strong for Doctor-
Aided Suicide Measure, OREGONIAN, Sept. 7, 1994, at BI (63% support for Oregon
initiative). After opponents focused public attention with advertisements,
however, support dwindled. See, e.g., Sura Rubenstein, Voters Split on Measure 16,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 6, 1994, at Al. Without this public ambivalence when
confronted with opposing arguments, advocates may have pressed for a bill
more to their liking. The drafters of the Oregon initiative emphasized the
limited nature of their proposal in an attempt to soothe the fears of voters.
O'Keefe, Lonely Vigi4 supra note 37, at BI. Fundraising letters, however, cast the
Oregon initiative as a stepping stone to legalized euthanasia. Wesley Smith,
Going Dutch ?, NAT'L REv., Oct. 10, 1994, at 60, 61. When put together, these
facts indicate that aid-in-dying in Oregon put together the strongest bill that
voters would accept.
67. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 75-76.
68. Id.
69. The Oregon legislature can alter the Oregon initiative freely, but
even opponents of aid-in-dying, bowing to the inevitable, largely have ruled out
efforts to make substantial changes to the initiative through the legislature. See
Tom Bates & Dee Lane, Oregon's Suicide Statute Faces Tests, OREGONIAN, Nov. 27,
1994, at Al (quoting state senator expressing hesitancy about changing
requirements for second opinion because voters "understood" the initiative to
set up a particular standard); Rob Carson, Oregon's Suicide Law to Face Fight in
Legislature, NEws TRIB., Dec. 11, 1994, at BI ("Outright repeal of the initiative is
unlikely, most legislators and lobbyists agree."); Warren Wolfe, Oregon May Rule
Today on Assisted Suicide, STAR TRIB., Dec. 19, 1994, at 1A (quoting Thomas
Balmer, deputy attorney general) ("The initiative process is very close to sacred
in Oregon. The Legislature tinkers, but it does not overturn a decision of the
voters. It just isn't done.").
70. Even noncontroversial initiatives in California require millions of
dollars to stand a reasonable chance of passage. Figures show that half of all
initiatives resulted in expenditures of over $1 million, and over 10 percent cost
at least $2.5 million. MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 148. Advocates of an
amendment could choose to spend less in the hopes that the "technical" nature
of the amendment will generate little if any opposition. Lee, supra note 54, at
90-91. This would not decrease the costs of obtaining signatures. Also, if
opponents do arise, and they outspend proponents by at least a 2-to-i margin,
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the legislature, with its committee system, bicameral structure
(except in Nebraska), executive veto, and responsibility for issues
other than the initiative itself,71 has a much greater capacity for
fashioning a compromise solution accounting for some of the
concerns of opponents,72 and thus will generally come closer to
the true public consensus than initiative drafters will.
The weaknesses of the drafting process, the reliance on
interest groups, and the inflexibility to compromise and amend-
ment all will undercut the effectiveness of any aid-in-dying initia-
tive. The specific aid-in-dying initiatives proposed to date reflect
these general problems.
B. Specific Flaws of Aid-in-Dying Initiatives
1. Washington and California Initiatives
One of the strongest charges leveled at both the Washing-
ton 73 and California 74 aid-in-dying initiatives concerned the lack
of procedural safeguards in the initiatives to limit the availability
and implementation of physician aid-in-dying. Aid-in-dying advo-
cates cast the Washington initiative in broad terms, hoping to
handle procedural details after passage. The voters refused to
enact such an uncertain system.
The drafters of the California initiative recognized that elec-
toral success would require spelling out more of the procedural
details.75 The California initiative, however, failed to include
many provisions widely believed necessary to ensure a knowing
and voluntary choice of physician aid-in-dying. For instance, it
did not distinguish between assisted suicide and euthanasia; the
latter impacts on the autonomy rights of a person to a greater
proponents will lose 87% of the time. MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 148; see also
supra note 41 for the spending of the Washington initiative.
The cost of the initiative process exposes one of its glaring weaknesses.
Over one-third of all campaign spending in California now goes toward
initiatives, which diverts a significant amount of time and money to single issues
and away from candidate elections. MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 149; see supra
note 39.
71. For a discussion of the benefits of government by a body responsible
for more than one issue, see MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 190.
72. Cf Shertz, supra note 48, at 590 (one-time sampling of public opinion
brings undeliberate responses rather than careful judgment, public discussion,
or consideration of needs of others).
73. For a general criticism of the Washington initiative, see Courtney S.
Campbell, "Aid-in-Dying" and the Taking of Human Life, 18 J. MED. ETHICS 128
(1992).
74. See, e.g., "Dying with Dignity Act" is Flawed, Bioethicist Says, Bus. WIRE,
Oct. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
75. HuMPHRY, supra note 63, at 40-41.
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degree than the former.76 Any doctor licensed to practice in the
state could have authorized the request of aid-in-dying, regard-
less of area of expertise.7 7 The certifying doctors did not need to
have established a previous relationship with the person.7" The
doctors had no duty to discuss other options with the person.7 9
In fact, doctors maintained no duty to determine whether the
person's pain proved beyond effective relief or not.8 0 The pro-
posal vaguely defined terminal illness to include people who two
doctors believed had less than six months to live, but did not
specify the level of care used as a benchmark from which to make
that judgment.8 1 While the California initiative required two
independent requests for aid-in-dying and that the request prove
"enduring", it placed no time limit between the first and second
request.8 The bill did nothing to assess the mental health of a
person requesting aid-in-dying beyond the physician voluntarily
requesting a psychological evaluation if the person approved.8
Finally, the bill required no witnesses for the actual request for
aid-in-dying or for the death itself, meaning that only the doctors
would have assessed whether the person acted under undue
influence or not.84
The Washington and California initiatives, then, did not
reflect the will of the people. The imprecision of drafting
resulted in proposals unpalatable even to many people who sup-
ported aid-in-dying in theory.
76. CeloCruz, supra note 9, at 390.
77. "'Physician' means a physician and surgeon licensed by the Medical
Board of California." California Initiative, supra note 12, § 2525.2(e).
78. Campbell, supra note 73, at 130. Given the importance of the
physician's judgment to the safeguards in the various initiatives, the degree of
consultation proves crucial to the effectiveness of the system. See Task Force,
supra note 29, at 129-30, 143-44.
79. Stephen Chapman, Will California Sanction Killing With Consent?, CHI.
TuB., Sept. 17, 1992, at 27.
80. Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 10, 1992, § 1, at 7.
81. The imprecision of prediction of terminal illness accentuates this
shortcoming. See Task Force, supra note 29, at 12.
82. "'Enduring request' means a request for aid-in-dying, expressed on
more than one occasion." California Initiative, supra note 12, § 2525.2(i).
83. "An attending physician who is required to give aid-in-dying may
request a psychiatric or psychological consultation if that physician has any
concern about the patient's competence, with the consent of a qualified
patient." Id. § 2525.13. Many people have questioned the ability of general
practitioners to make accurate psychological evaluations. See, e.g., Task Force,
supra note 29, at 127. The relative lack of protection for people suffering from
psychological depression or other treatable disorders takes on a disturbing light
given that some studies estimate that up to 95% of all people committing
suicide have such disorders. See Task Force, supra note 29, at 11.
84. Reinhold, supra note 39, at Al; Steinfels, supra note 80, § 1, at 7.
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2. Oregon Initiative
After the defeat of the California initiative, a coalition of aid-
in-dying advocates in Oregon gathered to draft a ballot initiative
in that state. They recognized that success would depend upon
convincing Oregon voters of the procedural' soundness of the
proposal.85 In some respects, the Oregon initiative does reflect
this priority. Most fundamentally, the initiative would legalize
only prescription of medication sufficient to end life by a physi-
cian; the initiative specifically excludes "lethal injection, mercy
killing or active euthanasia."86 A person wishing to receive a pre-
scription must make two oral requests fifteen days apart from
each other, 7 and a written request with two witnesses 88 executed
after confirmation of the terminal illness89 and at. least two days
before the writing of the prescription.9 ° The diagnosis of a ter-
minal illness by the "attending physician"91 receives confirmation
by a "consulting physician", "a physician who is qualified by spe-
cialty or experience to make a professional diagnosis and prog-
nosis regarding the patient's disease."92 And the attending
physician must discuss with the person "the feasible alternatives,
including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care and
pain control."9"
Despite these precautions, the Oregon initiative's provisions
remain, as one commentator has put it, "scanty and unclear."94
Public scrutiny of the Oregon initiative has revealed numerous
shortcomings, as the following survey will illustrate.
- Residency. The initiative includes only residents of Oregon. It
does not, however, spell out any standard for determining the
residency of those who make requests. In the absence of a spe-
85. Dana Tims, Euthanasia ProposalHeadedfor Voters, OREGONLAN, Sept. 13,
1993, at BI (quoting chairman of coalition as saying "building adequate
safeguards will be crucial to our success"). See Alexander Morgan Capron, Even
in Defeat, Proposition 161 Sounds a Warning, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 32 (43 percent of persons voting against California initiative cited
inadequate safeguards as primary reason for vote).
86. Oregon Initiative, supra note 10, § 3.14.
87. Id. § 3.06.
88. Id. § 2.02.
89. Id. § 2.01.
90. Id. § 3.08.
91. "'Attending physician' means the physician who has primary
responsibility for the care of the patient and treatment of the patient's terminal
disease." Id. § 1.01 (2).
92. Id. § 1.01(3).
93. Id. § 3.01 (2) (e).
94. Bates & Lane, supra note 69, at Al (quoting Garrett Epps, assistant
professor of constitutional law, University of Oregon Law School).
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cific standard, courts may turn to the traditional test of domicile:
presence in the state and intent to stay.95 This would render
largely ineffective the purpose of a residency requirement: the
desire to keep people from traveling to Oregon solely to take
advantage of the aid-in-dying laws.
- Doctor Relationship. As with the prior initiatives, the Oregon
initiative does not require that either doctor have maintained a
prior relationship with the person making the request. The initi-
ative does require that the "attending physician" have "primary
responsibility for the care of the patient,"96 but this does not pre-
clude a physician from taking that role upon receiving the first
oral request. If the doctor need not have maintained a prior
relationship with the person making the request, the possibility
of specialists of death emerges; even if this does not occur, doc-
tors not having a prior relationship will have less knowledge
about the patient, which could affect the quality of the diagnosis.
- Insurance. The Oregon initiative prohibits any effect on an
insurance or annuity policy as a result of a decision to pursue aid-
in-dying in accordance with the initiative.97 Insurance compa-
nies have expressed the fear that the initiative could prohibit
them from refusing to issue policies to persons with a terminal
illness.98
- Doctor Liability. The initiative provides an exclusion from
"civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary action for
participating in good faith compliance with this Act,"" but then
emphasizes the possibility of "liability for civil damages resulting
from other negligent conduct or intentional misconduct by any
person."100 These sections provide no clear gauge of the scope
of liability of doctors under the initiative, a particularly crucial
question given the uncertainty over whether malpractice insur-
ance covers aid-in-dying activities.' 01
- Recordkeeping. The initiative requires that the attending physi-
cian retain various documentation indicating compliance with
95. Courtney S. Campbell, The Oregon Trail to Death, COMMONWEAL, Aug.
19, 1994, at 9, 10.
96. Oregon Initiative, supra note 10, § 1.01.
97. Id. § 3.13.
98. Jeff Manning, Vote Puts Suicide Clause in Doubt, OREGONAN, Nov. 10,
1994, at BI.
99. Oregon Initiative, supra note 10, § 4.01 (1).
100. Id. § 4.02(3).
101. Diane M. Gianelli, Oregon Doctors Fear Fallout From Assisted Suicide, AM.
MED. NEWS, Jan. 23, 1995, at 1.
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the procedural requirements of the initiative,102 and the govern-
ment takes on the responsibility of privately reviewing a "sample"
of records and publicly issuing an "annual statistical report."l"'
The vagueness of these provisions has led observers to criticize
both either for perceived laxity or for perceived onerousness.
On the one hand, the fact that the government would not review
every case could give doctors the capability to evade the initia-
tive's procedural requirements with impunity.1 °4 On the other
hand, doctors have worried about the impact of any state review
on the confidentiality of medical records."0 5
- Evaluation of Patient Prognosis. The initiative sets out a specific
definition of "terminal disease,"0 6 but to a large extent a diagno-
sis of this sort represents a subjective judgment. The initiative
seeks to ensure accuracy through confirmation by a "consulting
physician" with "specialty or expertise to make a professional
diagnosis and prognosis regarding the patient's disease." 0 7 Still,
many observers have protested the limited nature of the confir-
mation. Some have insisted that doctors with expertise in pain
management and/or mental capacity have a role in the review.'
Also, one observer has proposed that the second opinion come
from a panel of experts as opposed to an individual doctor."
102. Oregon Initiative, supra note 10, § 3.09.
103. Id. § 3.11.
104. Campbell, supra note 95, at 11. See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE
TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 114 (1993) (arguing that the private nature of
legalized aid-in-dying defies regulation).
105. Gianelli, supra note 101, at 1.
106. " 'Terminal disease' means an incurable and irreversible disease that
has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment,
produce death within six (6) months." Oregon Initiative, supra note 10,
§ 1.01(12).
107. Id. § 1.01(3).
108. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 69, at BI. Suggestions of this sort flow
from the common assumptions that many patients receive inadequate pain
treatment and that most persons seeking aid-in-dying have a mental disorder
(see supra note 83). Indeed, the Oregon legislature passed a measure in 1993
authorizing persons with a terminal illness to instruct caregivers to emphasize
comfort instead of extension of life, in an effort to focus attention on adequate
pain relief. Sura Rubenstein, Storm Brews Over Right to Die, OREGONIAN, Dec. 6,
1993, at BI; Tims, supra note 85, at BI. Analysts have clashed over the effect of
legalized aid-in-dying on efforts to improve comfort care. Compare Charles J.
Dougherty, The Common Good, Terminal Illness and Euthanasia, 9 ISSUES IN L. &
MED. 151 (1993) (adverse effect) with DAN W. BROCK, LIFE AND DEATH 220
(1993) (expressing skepticism about claims of adverse effect).
109. Tom Bates, Medical Ethicists Debate Measure 16, OREGONIAN, Nov. 10,
1994, at All. See generally Franklin G. Miller & John C. Fletcher, Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia, in PI4ysicAN-ASSISmED DEATH 75 (James M.
Humber et al. eds., 1994).
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- The Act Itself. The initiative does not require that any other
person witness the actual taking of the lethal medication. Fur-
thermore, it does not prescribe any specific medications or dos-
ages.11° Thus, even though the initiative requires that the
attending physician inform the patient of the risks and probable
result associated with the medication,"1 the patient may take
the medication improperly, or it may not work as intended. 12
- Role of Pharmacists. The Oregon initiative limits aid-in-dying
to assisted suicide through self-administered medication in order
to avoid troublesome questions regarding autonomy. This limit,
however, creates separate problems. One involves the ability of
pharmacists opposed to aid-in-dying to avoid filling prescriptions
of lethal medication. The initiative allows any "health care pro-
vider" to refuse to participate in the procedure without pen-
alty,113 but this protection may not apply to pharmacists working
for managed care plans or drug store chains." 4
- De Facto Expansion to Other States. Another consequence of
legalizing assisted suicide rather than euthanasia involves the
possibility that people outside of Oregon will take advantage of
the possibility to obtain lethal doses of medication. So long as an
Oregon doctor writes the presecription, a pharmacy service in
any state could fill the prescription, which increases the chances
of abuse of the system.115
The Oregon initiative, then, leaves many questions unan-
swered. The manner in which Oregon intended to resolve ambi-
guities, though, proves even more disturbing. The initiative
would have taken effect on December 8, 1994 absent the
restraining order and injunction blocking enforcement. 1 6 One
week earlier, a state task force began writing rules to implement
the law; the administrator of the task force anticipated that the
task force would accomplish its aims in a single meeting. 1 7 The
110. Bates & Lane, supra note 69, at Al.
111. Oregon Initiative, supra note 10, § 1.01(7).
112. A practitioner of euthanasia in the Netherlands recently estimated
that one or every four patients do not die for hours or even days after taking the
prescribed medication. Mark O'Keefe, Dutch Researcher Warns of Lingering
Deaths, OREGONIAN, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al. Obviously, such warnings fuel doctors'
fear of liability under the initiative; see supra notes 99-101 and accompanying
text.
113. Oregon Initiative, supra note 10, § 4.01(2).
114. Diane M. Gianelli, Pharmacists Way of Assisted-Suicide Measure, AM.
MED. NEWS, Oct. 24, 1994, at 17.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
117. Bates & Lane, supra note 69, at Al.
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lack of attention to rulemaking, combined with the vagueness of
the law and the reluctance of the legislation to substantially alter
the initiative,' 18 meant that the details would take shape through
litigation." 9 The courts, as demonstrated earlier,120 do not
resolve questions of this sort as well as other bodies do. The fact
that the Oregon initiative will require extensive elucidation by its
courts represents perhaps its largest weakness.
C. Lessons of the Aid-in-Dying Initiatives
If the aid-in-dying initiatives had gone through the legisla-
tive process, the legislature surely would have addressed many of
the concerns left unresolved by the ballot measures. Public scru-
tiny of the proposals would have highlighted the initiatives' weak-
nesses, and proponents would have had the ability to alter the
proposals accordingly. As explained earlier, no initiative drafter
will accurately foresee all of the concerns of other parties, 121 and
drafters have an incentive to avoid procedural detail where possi-
ble to avoid confusing and alienating voters. 22 The failure of
the aid-in-dying initiatives to account successfully for the con-
cerns of others, then, represents a failure of the initiative system
itself rather than simply failures of the drafters. Since most peo-
ple consider the cost of poorly drafted aid-in-dying legislation
intolerable,1'2 an institutional structure more likely to produce
poorly drafted proposals does not satisfy the enduring will of the
people.
Aid-in-dying legislation inadequately guaranteeing that per-
118. See supra note 69.
119. Bates & Lane, supra note 69, at Al (quoting Jono Hildner, acting
administrator of the Oregon Health Division) ("It's up to the lawyers to really
decide."). Advocates of aid-in-dying have responded that parties concerned
about implementation should have assisted in drafting the initiative. See, e.g.,
Derek Humphry, Law Reform, 20 OHIo N.U. L. Rxv. 729, 730 (1994). The
nature of the initiative system, with the prominence of interest groups in
drafting and the need to avoid overly complex proposals, decreases the
likelihood of this occurring.
120. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
122. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
123. Most arguments along these lines stress that a lack of proper
procedure will mean that a "slippery slope" toward death of people not
envisioned by the statute will begin, because some doctors, particularly those
with no previous relationship with the person, would seek only to comply with
whatever procedure the statute mandates and little else. Campbell, supra note
73, at 132; CeloCruz, supra note 9, at 393; Schanker, supra note 44, at 1005. For
an argument that an open, legal regime would guard against such eventualities,
see Christine K. Cassel & Diane E. Meier, Morals and Moralism in the Debate Over
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 750, 751 (1990).
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sons make a knowing and voluntary choice to pursue physician
aid-in-dying not only carries high costs in and of itself, it becomes
more susceptible to invalidation on constitutional grounds. The
lines of attack pursued by the parties challenging the Oregon
initiative124 would not have had as much force had the proposal
gone through the legislature. In particular, with the increased
drafting attention the proposal would have received, the legisla-
ture could have accounted for some of the vagueness concerns
and for the questions of free exercise and association. The insti-
tutional biases of initiative systems toward less detailed proposals,
then, make constitutional challenges of these laws more
potent. 125
IV. PROPOSAL
The foregoing discussion identifies a dilemma. On the one
hand, aid-in-dying legislation rarely will receive serious considera-
tion if the legislature has exclusive authority to consider the
issue. On the other hand, if the people resort to a popular initia-
tive, they run the serious risk of passing an oversimplified law
subject to constitutional invalidation and a law reflecting the
desires of the drafters more than the desires of the people as a
whole. With these problems in mind, the question becomes
whether any way exists to combine the unique advantages of the
legislative and popular processes while reducing the disadvan-
tages of each system.
An optimal system for dealing with issues such as physician
aid-in-dying would leave the primary responsibility for the draft-
ing of appropriate proposals to the legislature. The people
would then have the unique benefits of legislative drafting and
review: a bill less vulnerable constitutionally, a bill with superior
procedural safeguards, and a bill better serving the interests of all
concerned. The legislature would also more likely make prudent
changes to improve any law passed, in comparison to the relative
rigidity of any popularly-passed law.
In exchange for this deference to the legislature, an optimal
system would enable the people to compel the legislature to con-
sider issues important to them such as aid-in-dying. As a neces-
124. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
125. Courts invalidate initiatives more often than they do statutes enacted
by the legislature, suggesting a structural difference in the quality of the laws.
Sirico, supra note 22, at 642. Courts review initiatives just as they would any
other law, but because initiatives face fewer institutional constraints, popularly
enacted laws might deserve less deference than laws enacted by a legislature.
Id. at 667-69.
19951
560 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
sary corollary, the legislature must reach a decision on the
question openly, so that the people may hold legislators account-
able for their decision on the subject. A vote to have legislators
consider aid-in-dying questions would accomplish little if legisla-
tors simply responded that they had considered the question but
could not find a proposal worth voting on.
Therefore, I propose the following framework for allowing
the public to play a role in the legislative process, in order to
attempt to satisfy all of these goals:
1. People who advocated a statutory change would draft a
proposed statute and circulate a petition to the public at large, as
the current initiative system provides. If a sufficient number of
registered voters sign the petition, the proposed statute would be
placed on the next general election ballot. The drafting of the
initial statute would remain in the hands of the advocates of
change, because the only alternative would involve some form of
legislative drafting, and the types of issues the drafters would
choose to submit to the people may not represent the issues the
public wishes to consider. The general election rule would help
further legislative accountability - legislators might have to take a
public position on any initiative before the voters at the same
time,126 and having initiative votes coincide with general elec-
tions facilitates efforts to hold legislators accountable later. The
touchy question centers on the threshold of signatures the state
should require before placing an issue before the voters. 27 Plac-
ing the threshold too low, especially if the legislature retains ulti-
mate responsibility for passing laws, raises the possibility of voters
placing too many issues before the voters;128 after all, little incen-
tive exists not to sign a petition to place a proposed initiative on
the ballot.12 a On the other hand, setting a high threshold, or
limiting the ballot to the proposals garnering the most signa-
tures, might freeze out too many issues from the ballot. Higher
thresholds probably would prove preferable, at least in the short
term, to assure that only issues of significant concern reached the
126. But see Reinhold, supra note 39, at Al (California senatorial
candidates took no position on California initiative).
127. Most states with direct initiatives require somewhere from 3 to 10
percent of the total votes cast for the governor in the preceding gubernatorial
election. For a list of the various requirements, see SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at
296-97.
128. Analysts routinely complain of "ballot clutter", where the number of
propositions presented to voters inevitably increases voter confusion and results
in a tendency not to vote on propositions appearing later on the ballot. See
MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at 90, 128. At least one analyst believed that the
Oregon initiative would face this problem. Campbell, supra note 95, at 11.
129. See supra note 49.
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voters. Aid-in-dying initiatives have the kind of grassroots sup-
port that make them more apt to survive the petition process if
handled properly."'
2. Voters would then decide whether or not to send the pro-
posed statute to the legislature. Sending a complete statute to
the legislature rather than simply commanding the legislature to,
say, consider the aid-in-dying issue serves several interests, includ-
ing giving the legislature a concrete reference point, giving the
people an easy means to judge legislators subsequently, and giv-
ing the voters more incentive to consider their votes carefully
(they presumably would not choose to send to the legislature a
statute they opposed on principle). Still, the major worry centers
on voters having little incentive to vote no in the belief that the
legislature will assume the responsibility for amending or refus-
ing the proposal. If the other checks have not solved this prob-
lem, the state could conceivably require a supermajority vote (or
a majority of all persons voting in the election regardless of
whether they voted on the initiative or not) l' for referral to the
legislature.
3. Within one year of a vote to refer the issue to the legisla-
ture, both houses of the legislature would have to vote on the
specific proposal referred to the legislature, regardless of any
other action taken on the subject. The time limit aims both to
give the legislature sufficient time to consider the proposal and
to compel a vote that leaves enough time for the voters to hold
legislators accountable for whatever choice they make. Compul-
sion of a vote has the goal of putting each lawmaker on record
on a particular question. The vote must occur on the specific
question sent to the legislature even if the legislature has passed
an amended version because the amended version may not
address the specific issues of the ballot measure. They could, of
course, use the existence of a legislative alternative (or the need
for more time to consider the issue) as a justification for a no
vote.
The most troublesome aspect of this portion of the proposal
concerns the lack of a sanction should the legislature steadfastly
refuse to vote on the issue. Despite the public command to go
on record on the issue, legislators may still conclude that the cost
of taking a public position on issues such as aid-in-dying out-
130. See supra note 50.
131. A small percentage of voters in a general election will not vote on
some or all of the ballot propositions. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 14, at
ch. 5. This "dropoff" occurs at lower rates for popular initiatives, though, than
for other ballot propositions. Id. at 90.
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weigh the benefits of submitting to a vote. One way to spur
action would involve letting the proposed statute become law
after one year if the legislature did not act to the contrary.13 2
This would give the legislature too much incentive, though, to
simply let the measure pass undisturbed unless the proposal con-
tained egregious flaws. In that event, the process would have
done little to alleviate the harms of the initiative process. There-
fore, the referred statute must fail if the legislature refuses to
vote. Even if no meaningful way exists to actually compel a vote,
though, the system itself could serve as a sufficient prod.133 Leg-
islators would have a difficult time convincing voters that the
people's best interests require a choice to defy a constitutional
voting requirement in order to avoid voting on a measure
referred to it by the majority of the voters.
Obviously, a system along these lines faces quite formidable
obstacles. No state currently has a system of this nature, so any
state wishing to establish a process of this sort would have to
amend its constitution. States that currently have an initiative
system would encounter the greatest difficulty in changing their
structures; voters would probably exhibit little enthusiasm toward
watering down their ability to enact legislation independent of
the legislature.134 Beyond the states, this proposal could extend
to the national level. Proposals for direct democracy of any sort
132. This represents the form of "indirect initiative" operative in many
states and recommended by several analysts. See ZIMmERtmAN, supra note 14, at
166.
133. Many provisions of the U.S. Constitution require the legislature or
the president to take specific action, with no sanction for violation specified
(except the ultimate threat of impeachment). These provisions include: the
requirement that Congress assemble at least once a year, U.S. Const. art. I, § 4;
the requirement that Congress maintain and publish a journal of its
proceedings, including any votes if one-fifth of its members request their
inclusion, id. at art. I, § 5; the requirement that the President nominate high-
ranking officials and that the Senate provide advice and consent on the specific
people nominated by the president, id. at art. II, § 2, amend. XXV, § 2; the
requirements that the President provide Congress with periodic information on
the state of the union and recommend bills, receive ambassadors, faithfully
execute the laws of the United States, and commission officers, id. at art. II, § 3;
the requirement that Congress call a constitutional convention if enough state
legislatures apply for one, id. at art. V; the various requirements placed on
Congress regarding the procedure of the Electoral College, id. at amend. XII,
amend. XX, § 3; and the requirement that Congress assemble and decide
within 21 days a dispute over the ability of the President to perform in office, id.
at amend. XXV, § 4. While none of these examples provides a precise analogy
to the compulsory vote envisioned here, they do indicate that compulsory
action without specific sanction does not go beyond the scope of the U.S.
Constitution.
134. CRONIN, supra note 1, at 241.
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at the national level currently remain the exclusive province of
academics l"' (and, maybe, Ross Perot and his followers),136 An
indirect process such as the one proposed here might prove
more palatable than a direct national initiative.
V. CONCLUSION
With the preceding discussion in mind, the potential impli-
cations for physician aid-in-dying can receive more explicit con-
sideration. Under initiative systems as currently structured, the
resolution of aid-in-dying questions will most likely not represent
the true wishes of the majority of the people. Where the legisla-
ture maintains a free hand, the sensitive political nature of aid-in-
dying will tend to suppress any consideration of the issue, much
less permit any affirmative decision on the matter. On the other
hand, none of the initiatives put forth to date satisfactorily deal
with the issues, and the failures reflect general failings of the ini-
tiative process.
The system proposed above, though, could solve some of
these problems. The effective gathering of signatures for aid-in-
dying petitions in the past indicates that even if states used a high
threshold for placement on the ballot, aid-in-dying initiatives
would reach the electorate. The vote would provide a crucial test
of public opinion, in a context different from the votes on the
previous initiatives. The Washington, California, and Oregon
experiences show that many voters have sympathy for the aid-in-
dying cause but may not have cared for the initiatives as specifi-
cally drafted."3 7 The proposed system would give the legislature
an incentive to fill the measure out with appropriate amend-
ments; this in turn may convince voters generally supportive of
aid-in-dying to send a reasonably drafted bill to the legislature.
In other words, provided that the sponsors draft the initiative
carefully enough to reflect the general desires of the people, the
135. See SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 181 (advocating direct national
initiative).
136. Perot made the "electronic town meeting", where citizens would
voice their opinions on selected national issues, a centerpiece of his
presidential candidacy, although the procedural details escaped most observers
(including, no doubt, Perot himself). See John Mintz, Perot Sampler Short on
Policy Details; Unconventional Texas Non-Candidate Grilled at Editors'Forum, WASH.
POST, Apr. 11, 1992, at Al; Evan I. Schwartz, Electronic Town Meetings: Reach Out
and Vote for Something, Bus. WEEY, Apr. 13, 1992, at 38.
A Canadian legislator proposed a national referendum on physician aid-in-
dying after the controversial assisted suicide of Sue Rodriguez, but Prime
MinisterJean Chretien curtly dismissed the proposal. David Vienneau, MPs Will
Decide How to Vote on Suicide, PM Insists, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 17, 1994, at A14.
137. See supra note 66.
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vote would become a purer test of principle. If the public
decided to send the proposal to the legislature, the legislature
could subject the proposal to greater scrutiny and amend the
proposal as needed. The legislature could then choose to pass
the initiative itself, reject it on the grounds that the legislature
had developed a better alternative, or reject aid-in-dying legaliza-
tion altogether. Whatever the outcome, the legislature's vote on
the popular proposal would make it accountable to the
electorate.
A democratic government does not work to the maximum
benefit of the people as a whole if its institutions either suppress
issues or adopt misguided laws which do not reflect the enduring
will of the majority of the people. Restructuring the political sys-
tem to combine the best aspects of direct democracy and repre-
sentative democracy would bring the laws arising from the
democratic system on issues like aid-in-dying closer to the long-
term wishes of the people. The aid-in-dying dilemma illustrates,
perhaps better than any other issue, the need to make an
attempt to make our society more truly democratic.
